The Lex Specialis Principle and its Uses in Legal Argumentation.  An Analytical Inquire by Zorzetto, Silvia
Eunomía. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad 
Nº 3, septiembre 2012 – febrero 2013, pp. 61-87. 
ISSN 2253-6655 
Recibido: 1 de julio de 2012 
Aceptado: 31 de agosto de 2012 
61 
E 
S
T
U
D
I
O
S 
 
 
The Lex Specialis Principle and its Uses in Legal Argumentation.  
An Analytical Inquire 
 
 
Silvia Zorzetto 
University of Milan 
zorzetto@fildir.unimi.it 
 
 
Abstract 
The lex specialis principle according to which special rules derogate from general ones lies in 
the core of the Western legal tradition. In the eyes of jurists and legal philosophers this 
principle is one of the most typical criterion against legal antinomies and has a plain and clear 
meaning. Most theories are concerned only with its interferences with the lex posterior and 
the lex superior principles. But this common view is unsatisfactory in many aspects. In fact, 
the lex specialis principle may be applied and it is often used to solve redundancy in law, 
rather than legal antinomies, and so it is a tool to prevent the simultaneous application of 
special and general compatible rules. This use is prominent in criminal law but it is 
widespread even in the other fields of law. Moreover, in every fields of law, the lex specialis 
principle is a device to coordinate and integrate special and general rules to obtain a more 
complete regulation of a certain matter: this use is essential for legal systems. In this paper 
there will be distinguished and discussed three very general topics: the speciality of law, i.e. 
the genus-species relationship among legal concepts; the phenomena of total-partial 
antinomies and of concurrent and repetitive rules; the derogation among special and general 
rules in the context of legal justification. 
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El principio de lex specialis y su uso en la argumentación jurídica:  
Una aproximación analítica 
Resumen 
La idea de lex specialis de acuerdo con la cual las reglas especiales derogan a las más 
generales es central en la tradición jurídica occidental. Los juristas y filósofos del Derecho 
presentan la lex specialis fundamentalmente como un criterio para resolver las antinomias 
jurídicas. Su significado a menudo es considerado sencillo y claro y la mayoría de las teorías 
se ocupan básicamente de sus interferencias con los principios lex posterior y lex superior. 
Creo que esta posición es insatisfactoria. De hecho, el principio lex specialis con frecuencia 
es empleado para resolver las redundancias en el Derecho, es decir, la aplicación 
simultánea de reglas específicas y generales compatibles. Este uso es patente en el 
Derecho penal, pero está también extendido en otras áreas del Derecho. Además, en todas 
las ramas jurídicas, nuestro principio sirve para coordinar e integrar reglas especiales y 
generales para obtener una regulación más completa de determinados asuntos: la 
vinculación de estas reglas constituye una herramienta fundamental de los sistemas 
jurídicos. Por tanto, en este artículo intento distinguir tres cuestiones: la especialidad del 
Derecho, es decir, la relación género-especie entre los conceptos jurídicos; el fenómeno de 
las antinomias total-parcial y las reglas concurrentes y reiterativas; la derogación entre reglas 
especiales y generales en el contexto de la justificación jurídica. 
 
Palabras clave 
Principio de lex specialis, razonamiento jurídico, conceptos jurídicos, antinomia, 
redundancias en el Derecho.  
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1. A typical tool of legal thinking 
According to a plain belief, law may be conceived as nature in the guise of 
genera and species. In actual fact it is very common to portray as entities related per 
genus and differentia legal systems or laws, likewise legal concepts or rules. The lex 
specialis principle is a main appearance of this scenario. In short, as widely known, 
this principle envelops the idea that any special rule derogates from those more 
general, according to the Latin legal maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali. 
On a historical view, this principle has been seen many times as an essential 
device to discover the real structure of law (Stein, 1966). To limit the discourse to the 
Modern Ages, first in the late Middle Ages and then in the Humanism period, the lex 
specialis principle has been frequently shaped according to predetermined 
systematic patterns. In these centuries, the idea that special rules derogate from 
general ones has been grown closely with the firm belief that laws and legal rules 
take root in previous entities and should reflect them. 
In the current Western legal tradition the lex specialis principle seems not to 
be compromised with this background yet1. As a matter of fact, essentialism towards 
special and general rules in actual legal practice is not completely disappeared. In 
many cases jurists and judges still show various essentialist attitudes in the 
application of the lex specialis principle. But these attitudes are fairly superficial and 
they seem to resemble, rather than a real deep ontology, preferences and value 
choices among alternative normative solutions. 
Of course, between the lex specialis principle and essentialism in law there 
are no conceptual nor logical or necessary connections. The pure idea that special 
rules derogate from more general ones is compatible equally with essentialist or anti-
essentialist concepts of law. 
A small evidence of this circumstance is that, in the current legal practice, the 
lex specialis principle is ordinarily used to lawyers and judges that join anti-
systematic legal doctrines or manifest skepticism towards any systematic view of 
law. Also legal thinkers that refuse any version of essentialism are acquainted with 
this principle and include it among the typical instruments of the legal toolbox. 
In this analysis, I will approach the lex specialis principle from an analytical 
perspective2. But the semiotic and constructive view here proposed may represent 
an explanation also of the alternative essentialist views. 
2. The outline of the analysis 
To give an outline of my analysis, first, in the next paragraph, I will sketch 
some uncontested points of legal doctrines and theories about the lex specialis 
principle. Then, in the further paragraphs, I will distinct and examine in particular 
three topics that many doctrines and theories usually mix up. 
                                                 
1 Of course, there are significant exceptions. To give two samples, let consider for instance the 
discussion among Bulygin, Raz and Alexy about the concept of law and the features of legal concepts 
(Bulygin, Raz and Alexy, 2007): in the eyes of Bulygin (2007: 100-102), Raz’s approach to (legal) 
concepts since profess the existence of certain natural conceptual features is vitiated by essentialism. 
Besides, consider all those essentialist approaches to special and general rules that have been 
developed in the past and still are proposed in the present on the grounds of natural law theories such 
as for instance the Aquinas practical reason conception (Pattaro, 2005). 
2 A preliminary draft of this paper has been presented at a seminar discussed at the Oxford 
Jurisprudence Discussion Group on May 17, 2012 (see http://www.oxford-jdg.net/). In this paper, I will 
seek to give a further clarification of some details of the analysis I did in my book (Zorzetto, 2010). 
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A first topic is the meaning of speciality in law domain and, on the opposite 
side, the generality that is to say the genus-species relationship among legal entities 
or, to be more precise, among legal concepts. 
A second topic regards the deontic relationships among special and general 
rules and therefore two phenomena that are characteristic of our legal systems: total-
partial antinomies and concurrent and repetitive rules. 
A third topic is the derogation among legal rules and in particular among 
special and general rules in the context of legal justification. 
Each one of these topics refer to a fundamentally distinct relationship: first, 
the genus-species relationship is a correlation among the semantic content of rules 
and hence their legal concepts; rather, legal antinomies and redundancy or 
recurrences in law primarily depend on the relationships among the deontic 
modalities of legal rules; finally, derogation requires a correlation among legal rules 
in legal reasoning. Each of these relationships belongs to a different domain: 
respectively the domains of legal semiotics, of deontic logic and of legal justification. 
The prime operative consequence of this very abstract analysis is that no 
special rules necessary either conflict with those more general or derogate from 
them. 
A special rule A may conflict with a general rule B and derogate from this 
second rule B, according to the lex specialis principle, but it may also be compatible 
with a more general rule C and concur with it. 
For example3, a rule such as everyone has the right to use his language in 
procedures before authorities performing a public function is more general than a 
rule such as the parties and other participants in the proceedings may use their 
language at hearings and during other oral proceedings before courts. The former is 
also compatible with the latter, since the latter is a specification of the former and 
concurs with it to regulate the matter in more detail. On the other side, the latter is 
also special with regard to a rule that provides that in all proceedings before courts 
everyone must use the national language of the State. There is an obvious conflict 
between these rules and to solve such antinomy we can use the lex specialis 
principle. 
However, the lex specialis principle in itself does not necessary involve any 
conflict among special and general rules and it does not operate only as a criterion to 
solve legal antinomies. Although legal scholars and legal philosophers do not usually 
stress this point, in many relevant cases, the lex specialis principle is used to solve 
or prevent instead the simultaneous application of special and general rules, when 
they are compatible and hence would concur. This use of the principle is of the 
utmost importance in criminal law but it is evident and it permeates the legal 
reasoning even in the other branches of law. 
The distinction I mentioned above among special and general legal concepts, 
deontic modalities and rules is a first step to shed light on the pervasive and diverse 
uses of the lex specialis principle actually existing in legal practice. Looking into 
these uses can be a main route to make a more realistic description of a legal 
system as it is and to comprehend the real functioning of legal reasoning. 
                                                 
3 See the art. 62 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia and the art. 102 of the Civil Procedure 
Act (Zakon o pravdnem postopku, or ZPP). 
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3. The common perspective on the lex specialis principle 
A positive criterion against legal antinomies 
Legal scholars and legal thinkers use to draw a common picture of the lex 
specialis principle4. 
According to the mainstream in legal practice and the general theory of law, 
the lex specialis principle is neither an inner feature of every legal system nor a 
logical principle. Rather, it is just a positive rule whose existence depends on the 
normative choices of the legal authorities (i.e. legislators and/or legal interpreters). In 
the eyes of jurists and theoreticians, the lex specialis principle is mostly a traditional 
and implicit rule that is independent by all its expressed formulations in legal texts. In 
actual fact, its origin and nature are disputed: there is no consensus for instance on 
its customary nature. But, in spite of this detail, as I said above, there is wide 
agreement that it is a historical tool to make laws and legal rules consistent. In short, 
it represents one of the most typical criteria against legal antinomies together with 
the hierarchical and the temporal criteria, currently known as the lex posterior and 
the lex superior principles. 
In particular, the lex specialis principle is considered a rule feasible to prevent 
or to solve conflicts among legal rules within one and the same legal system and 
hence to delimit the material sphere among different laws and legal rules (these days 
the lex specialis principle has a paramount importance for instance relating to the 
conflicts among international laws, international humanitarian law and human rights 
law)5. The content or the meaning of the principle is generally described as plain and 
clear and in point of fact it is assumed without giving any clarification. In the opinion 
of legal philosophers, the application of the principle to real cases is not genuinely 
interesting unless in particular circumstances. Thus, most theories investigate only 
the possible interferences existing between the lex specialis principle and the other 
main criteria mentioned above: the lex posterior and the lex superior principles. In 
spite of that, the concrete application of the lex specialis principle very often causes 
a serious concern among lawyers and judges: in any fields of law, there are 
remarkable disagreements about the special and the general nature of rules and 
their derogating force. 
 
                                                 
4 During the XIX century, many legal scholars and philosophers have developed significant legal 
theories about the lex specialis principle. Even though the interest towards the theme is gradually 
decreased since the second part of the last century and especially these days, the contemporary 
literature about the lex specialis principle is very extensive just the same. Here I can recall only few 
works. A fair map of the logical issues involved in the genus-species relationship is given by the 
analysis of García Máynez (1959) and Klug (1996: 57). Relating to the general theory of law, the 
common approach to the lex specialis principle is paradigmatically described in the analysis, for 
instance, of Kelsen (1962: 339; 1991: 106-114 and 123-127), Ross (2004: 129-130) and Engisch (1970:  
255-274). With regard to Italian analytical approach some main studies on the lex specialis principle 
are, for instance, the works of Gavazzi (1959: 62 and 81); Bobbio (1967: 303-322; 1993: 209); Tarello 
(1980: 313, 336 and 382); Carcaterra (1990: 167; 1994: 177), Chiassoni (1999: 277, 286-287, 344); 
Pino (2006: 160-161); Ferrajoli, (2007: 689, 690, 691 and 909); Barberis (2011); Guastini, (2011: 117). 
Among Italian legal scholars some remarkable theories have been developed by Frosali (1971); 
Mantovani (1966); Pagliaro (1976: 217); Modugno (1979: 507); Irti (1999). With reference to the 
Spanish and the South American analytical legal theor  let co s   er   or sa ple the st   es  o  
 lc ho rr   a    a   s o  (1981); Aguiló Regla (1995); Nino (1996: 243-244); Manero (2005); Martínez 
Zorrilla (2007: 148 and 151); Guarinoni (2001; 2006); Ochoa (2003); Rodilla (2009: 255-314); Tolosa 
(2010: 103-123); Ferrer and Rodríguez (2011: 135-167). 
5 See e.g. Sassol  (2007); Pr  ’ho  e (2007); Schabas (2007). 
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The extensional approach to speciality 
To examine in detail the common picture of the principle, both in legal 
practice and in legal thinking, special and general rules are seen as entities 
correlated, as they are logical classes or geometric sets. To represent the 
relationship existing between special and general rules it is common to speak 
indifferently of circles or circumferences and these figures are also drawn but 
normally without explaining the meaning. There the genus-species relationship 
among rules is simply reduced to a formal inclusion. In this respect, the fundamental 
semantic bases of this relationship is totally ignored unless in few analyses. The 
point of view of the analyses is so merely extensive without regard to the intensive 
dimension of the genus-species relationship. This means that legal language is 
figure out as a formal language and that legal rules and legal concepts are conceived 
as perfectly defined and exactly determinate as classes and sets are in logic and 
mathematics. As a consequence, many analyses handle the lex specialis principle 
with a rudimentary semiotics based on a rough distinction between logical syntax 
and its rules of interpretation, albeit this distinction does not apply to legal language 
that it is not of course a calculus. 
Moreover, legal scholars usually talk about the lex specialis principle 
embracing a broad concept of (special and general) rules. It is uncontested that a 
rule may be special when correlated with another one in the same way as a species 
is related to a genre. But in law it is not clear-cut which elements are precisely the 
correlatives. In legal practise, but also in many theories the genus and the species 
(i.e. the common element and the special difference) are not well identified. In 
particular, there is no inclination for distinguishing among rules, their elements (the 
legal concepts of each rule) and the singular concrete situation to which a rule may 
be applied. Speciality as generality seems to be conceived as a property of two 
opposite and correlated rules, considering each rule as a whole abstract entity. But, 
in depth, only certain elements of rules rather than the rule itself are relevant in the 
eyes of legal scholars. In addition, the relevant elements are various and variable 
according to the circumstances: in many cases it seems relevant the entire class of 
situations regulated by the rule but on the other hand only the subject or the conduct 
or a temporal or spatial requirement has the utmost importance. Finally, sometimes it 
comes to play directly the concrete situation to which rules refer. 
Two unexplored issues: conditions and reasons of derogation 
Furthermore, lots of theories about the lex specialis principle purely affirm 
that, on the strength of it, special rules derogate from those more general. Obviously, 
this is a tautological explanation that leaves open at least two main issues: on one 
hand, which are the conditions to apply the principle; on the other hand, which is the 
reason of the derogation according to it. 
Of course, a first necessary condition to apply the lex specialis principle is the 
reciprocal speciality and generality of rules. But, as I said above, it is very common to 
argue that derogation comes to play when there is a conflict between the special and 
the general rule. In this view the inconsistency of rules is another condition to apply 
the principle. Usually this idea is ambiguous because it might be interpreted as a 
logical assumption but also as a sociological thesis. However, in any case it is 
misleading, since on the grounds of logic special rules may be compatible with 
general ones and on a sociological perspective derogation is a remarkable 
phenomena even when rules are compatible. 
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Rather, there is another condition to apply the lex specialis principle not overt 
in legal thinking: the application of the principle depends on the previous 
identification of distinct rules. In fact, considering that according to the principle a 
special rule derogates from one more general, the correlative rules in hand must be 
identified and ranked in advance in a certain order of lower/higher generality. Yet, if 
this is true, the lex specialis principle cannot be a device to identify (special and 
general) rules. It is able to come to play when the works of interpreting and 
identifying rules has already been done. 
With regard to the second issue mentioned above, it is ambiguous whether 
the reciprocal speciality/generality of rules represents not only a necessary condition 
to apply the lex specialis principle, but also the precise reason of derogation. 
Roughly speaking, the crucial alternative is if, according to the lex specialis principle, 
special rules derogate from those more general on the strength of their speciality or if 
they can derogate instead in virtue of other reasons. For instance, other features that 
might be relevant are the spatial or chronological sphere of application, the occasion 
of the promulgation, the pertinence to a certain sedes materiae or branch of law, the 
authority from which the rule belongs to, the favour for a certain category, the 
severity of punishments, etc. 
The qualification of fact and the choice of rules 
According to many theories, special rules exclude those general and this 
exclusion is presented as a feature of a special rule in itself. This view is misleading 
since it does not distinguish between two functions of rules: a rule is of course a 
prescription but it also gives a qualification to certain (abstract or concrete) 
situations. Any special rule necessarily refers to a rank of situations comprehended 
also by all more general rules. In virtue of the logic inclusion, special and general rule 
give multiple and compatible descriptions of the single situation or class of situations 
to which they refer. Then, considering their discipline, special and general rules may 
be compatible prescriptions or not depending on their deontic modalities. In both 
cases, there is the problem of derogation, that is to say the issue of which rule 
should be applied. This latter issue is logically distinct by the former sketched above, 
although there is place for derogation only when multiple qualifications can coexist. 
In fact, only since a same situation or class of situations may be qualified by more 
than one rule (i.e. multiple qualifications) it makes sense to search and choice the 
rule (more or less special or general) that has to be applied6. In this perspective, a 
deficiency of the common view is not to stress this point and to put derogation in its 
proper place: derogation and not speciality is a phenomenon that pertains to the 
external justification7. 
4. The speciality and the generality of rules 
An inquire in intensional logic 
Th s, what  s  ea t b  “spec al r le” or “ge eral r le”? I  wh ch se se legal 
scholars a   legal ph losophers  req e tl  sa  that certa   r les are “spec al” or 
“ge eral”?     o  wh ch req  re e ts  s  t poss ble to q al    a r le as “spec al” or 
“ge eral”? 
                                                 
6 This point is correctly stressed for instance by Papa (1997). 
7 From this view, a suitable clarification of the lex specialis pr  c  ple’s str c t re  and functions belongs to 
the analyses of Wróblewski (1967); Lazzaro (1971); Bulygin (1982; 1991; 1992); Comanducci (1992: 
60-64); Moreso and Navarro (1996); Navarro, Orunesu, Rodríguez, Sucar (2000); Moreso (2002). 
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Here  a ter w th the ter  ‘r le’ I  ea  a positive prescription determined by 
legal interpretation and, hence, one of the possible meanings of a written legal 
statement such as, for instance, a paragraph or a section of a statute or a sentence 
in a judicial decision. 
‘Spec al’ a   ‘ge eral’ are correlative terms and predicate adjectives denoting 
a genus-species relationship among certain entities. In its form this relationship is 
isomorphic to inclusion among mathematical sets and logical classes. This is evident 
in logic as in the modern natural sciences, where the genus-species relationship has 
a systematic application. But this is invariably indisputable in ordinary languages and 
also in law. 
Legal texts a   legal prov s o s o te  expl c tl  q al    the selves as “spec al” 
or “ge eral”.      teresting sample is the article 6 entitled Special rule on defence of 
the Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance 
Obligations according to which In the case of maintenance obligations other than 
those arising from a parent-child relationship towards a child (…), the debtor may 
contest a claim from the creditor on the ground that there is no such obligation under 
both the law of the State of the habitual residence of the debtor and the law of the 
State of the common nationality of the parties, if there is one.8. The speciality of this 
rule, however, does not root in the auto-qualification of the legal statement in which it 
is expressed, but in the circumstance that the rule gives to a specified category of 
debtors a determined power of exception that it is presumed all the other debtors do 
not have. 
In many analyses about the lex specialis principles it is not clear-cut if 
speciality and generality are properties of rules rather than of the legal statements in 
which rules are expressed. As yet I think I am able to show that speciality and 
generality are properties neither of rules nor of legal statements. 
First, these predicates cannot pertain by nature to texts, sentences, 
statements, words or signs giving that speciality as generality are opposite and 
correlated conceptual properties, i.e. logical-semantic features of concepts. In fact, 
the co cept o  color   cl  es the co cept o  re , eve     the wor  ‘color’  oes  ot 
share a   co  o  s g  w th the wor  ‘re ’. 
But, in addition, speciality as generality is none a character of legal rules 
considering a rule as a whole entity. To show this point it is useful to recall our 
ordinary intuitions. Though rules are not objects, in the same way as the speciality of 
an object belongs to its features and not to the object in itself, the speciality of a rule 
is related to its features and not to the rule as a whole. For instance, star apple is a 
special fruit giving that it has a star-shaped cross section: this specific difference is 
the relevant feature that makes star apple a special fruit. Equally, rules concerning 
dogs ceteris paribus will be special with regards to rules concerning animals since 
the concept of dog is special with regards to the concept of animal. 
Speciality as generality are features related to the content of legal rules that 
hence precisely pertains to their conceptual components. Legal concepts that 
compose rules and not rules themselves are the pivotal terms of the genus-species 
                                                 
8 Available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=133. (Date of access: 
August 31, 2012). 
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relationship9. Sa   g that a certa   r le  s “spec al” or “ge eral”  s a  eto    , 
although legal scholars never say so. 
In this view it becomes crucial inquiring the conceptual relationships existing 
among legal concept and the real task is to individuate which legal concepts are 
relevant and count as common elements or specific differences. Of course, this 
inquire may be extremely complex considering the nature of legal language. 
While there is an evident relation between two rules such those ones that 
provides that the right of property shall be inviolable and that no person shall be 
ordered to surrender his property except where required in the public interest10: there 
is no doubt in fact that the latter rule is special with regard to the former given that 
the concept of property links them. Instead, it is not obvious whether a rule according 
to which a third person can be called by a party in guarantee in the first defensive 
response is special or not relating to a rule according to which the guarantor is suited 
at the first hearing on demand of the parties and with the authorization of the judge. 
In this case, the speciality is a variable of the structure of the process. 
These samples show that it is logically possible to identify a rule A as 
“ge eral” w th regar  to a r le B, o l  ass    g that the   rst  enotes a certain genre 
and the second a species. Conversely, it is impossible to identify any special rule 
without assuming ex hypothesis that it refers to a species of a pre-determinate genre 
regulated by another rule. In this perspective, the speciality/generality of law and 
legal rules is not a pure logical-syntactic issue, but entails also in depth a semantic 
approach. To comprehend speciality/generality is a task that requires an intensional 
inquire as in logic so in law. Formal inclusion is based on an ordered construction of 
concepts or inferior and superior classes11. 
 
                                                 
9 This thesis that the genus-species relationship pertains to the semantic content of legal rules so their 
legal concepts can be explained using two common models of legal rules. On one hand, it can be used 
the categorical model and the distinction of R.M. Hare (1952; 1967) between the phrastic and the 
neustic. According to this model, the speciality of rules may depend on the propositional content of 
rules, the phrastic, and/or on the neustic, that is to say, its deontic modality. On the other hand, it can be 
used the hypothetical rule model, according to which a rule may be special on the strengths of the 
concepts of its antecedent (the descriptive part of the rule) and/or of its consequent (the effects or the 
sanction in legal parlance) as well on the strengths of its deontic modality. Legal concepts in my 
perspective are the basic elements of rules conceiving a rule as a prescription, that is to say, a semiotic 
and normative entity -on this topic see Scarpelli (1985 and 1969). A concept is a legal concept since it is 
a part of a legal rule. Legal concepts may belong to ordinary languages or other linguistic contexts (e.g. 
the discourses of jurists and judges, the legislation process, politics, ethics, natural sciences or other 
sciences such as economics, etc.). Every legal concept may be relevant to speciality according to 
certain previous assumptions. 
10 See the art. 73. 
11 A very useful device to elucidate the genus-species relationship in the domain of law is the strict 
implication as defined by Lewis (1918; 1950). This form of implication fits in the intensional logic 
approach, rather than in the extentional logic approach that prevails in contemporary formal logic and 
mathematics, and it demonstrates that the genus-species relationship, in logic as well as in every other 
domain, included the law, is of a semantic nature. For this reason and given that legal rules are a 
semiotic object and that their truth-value is problematic, the strict implication notion seems to me the 
best logic tool to examine the speciality and generality of law. See Zorzetto (2010), Ch. 2 and Appendix: 
the sa e str c t re o  Lew s’ str ct implication is shared by many others logical relationships, such as, 
for instance, the formal implication of Russell, the intensional implication of Klug, the L-implication of 
Carnap, the generalized conditional of Quine, the rigid implication of Pasquinelli, the logical 
consequence of Geymonat. As the historical studies of Bochenski demonstrate, also a form of 
implication conceived by Diodorus Cronus and described by Crisippus presents the same structure of 
Lew s’ str ct   pl cat o . Th s      o    pl cation is even useful to explicate some logical schemes 
formulated by medieval and contemporary logicians such as Petrus Abelardus, William of Champeaux, 
Reichenbach and Toulmin. 
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Legal concepts, basic assumptions and disagreements 
This basic analysis has three important corollaries. 
A first corollary is that speciality as generality is not an inner feature of legal 
rules or laws but it is a variable involved in the previous assumptions of all those who 
use rules. Hence it largely depends on the assumption of legal interpreters, jurists 
and judges. An open inventory of some common assumptions might encompass for 
instance human intuitions about reality, common sense ideas, positive moral 
considerations, conceptions on the nature and the functions of law, legal doctrines 
held in certain branches of positive law or legal institutions, legal policies, moral 
values, hypotheses about purposes or ratios of legal rules, ethical or moral values 
and so on. The construction and conceptual linkages among legal concepts and in 
particular the genus-species relationships lie upon all these factors. 
A second corollary is that all the disagreements about the special/general 
nature of legal rules, that so often characterize legal literature and jurisprudence, are 
caused, at bottom, by different basic assumptions of interpreters. The assumptions 
mentioned above are the real origin of the disputes about the speciality insofar they 
represent the route along which interpreters shape legal concepts and the 
conceptual linkages among rules. Most disagreements among legal scholars seem 
to be irresoluble, since these diverse assumptions are normally undeclared in the 
discussions. 
The “fulcrum” of speciality and the relevant legal concepts 
A third corollary of my analysis is that a legal rule may be special or general 
w th regar  to  ts  a   cla se:  s  g the h pothet cal  o el “    , the  B”, a rule can 
be special when its antecedent A involves a specific difference. But, a legal rule may 
be special or general also with regard to its consequence: the sanction or the 
punishments or the effects in legal parlance, in the model represented by the symbol 
“B”. Bes  es, a legal r le  a  be spec al or ge eral eve  co s  er  g  ts  eo t c 
modality. 
Let us consider the following examples. 
Example 112 
General rule: During the period provided for in Article 42, the consumer has a 
right to withdraw from the contract. 
Special rule: The consumer may exercise the right to withdraw at any time 
before the end of the period of withdrawal provided for in Article 42. 
The second rule is special and the first is general, because of the second 
specifies a feature of the right stated by the first. The italics above illustrate that the 
key-concept on which the genus-species relationship is based is here the concept of 
duration. Whe  we   terpret the express o  “  r  g the per o ”     ts or   ar  
meaning the specification given by the special rule seems wholly superfluous 
(redundant in legal parlance). But then it is not so in legal discourses. To understand 
correctly speciality in law we have to take into account that legal language has its 
own rules that may be different from the rules that govern ordinary discourses. 
                                                 
12 See the articles 40 and 41 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Common European Sales Law. 
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Example 213 
General rule: A person who takes the life of another shall be sentenced for 
murder to imprisonment for ten years or for life. 
Special rule: A woman who kills her child at birth or at a time, when, owing to 
her confinement, she is in a disturbed mental state or in grave distress, shall be 
sentenced for infanticide to imprisonment for at most six years. 
It is apparent that the second rule is special and the first is general. That 
depends on the genus-species relationship existing between the two crimes (and 
concepts) of murder and infanticide. In fact, if we examine the main clauses of the 
two rules, we see that a woman in a disturbed mental state or in grave distress is a 
person; then, killing is a way to take a life; that a child is another person; finally, that 
the second rule gives relevance to a certain moment of the action, near to the birth 
and the time of the confinement, while for the first rule the moment of the action 
makes no difference. 
As the italics added to the text illustrate, in this case, as the two crimes are 
related from genre to species, then so too are the rules. It does not matter whether 
the two sanctions are different. But, of course, this is not a logical necessity. 
Speciality is here uncontested since we have the habitual pattern to conceive 
criminal law as a system of crimes rather than of punishments. There when 
classifying penal laws as special or general it appears absolutely obvious 
co s  er  g o l  the cr  es’ characters a   not those of punishments. However, it is 
equally obvious, once we think of it, that also punishments may be classified in 
genera and species. This is particularly evident in those legal systems such as the 
Italian, Spanish, Slovenian and Swedish legal systems, where the punishments are 
explicitly classified in penal codes or criminal general acts. 
Example 3 
General rule: Persons that have a physical disability have the right to be 
exempted by military service. 
Special rule: Persons that have a physical disability have the duty to perform 
a substitutive civil service in accordance with their individual capabilities. 
In this case, the second rule is special towards the first relating to their effects 
or consequences. Speciality depends on a double factor: the particular linkages 
existing between the concepts of exemption and substitution, on one hand, and the 
concepts of military and civil services, on the other hand. 
Example 4 
General rule: Parents are free to have their children vaccinated. 
Special rule: Parents have a duty to vaccinate their children. 
General rule: Not hunting deer is permitted. 
Special rule: Hunting deer is forbidden. 
                                                 
13 See the sec. 1 and 3, of Ch. 3, Part 2, of the Criminal Code of the Kingdom of Sweden. 
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With reference to these rules the fulcra of the genus-species relationship are 
the deontic modalities. The provision that parents are free to give a vaccination to 
their children is general compared with the provision that parents have a duty to 
vaccinate their children because in deontic logic ought implies –as a necessary albeit 
non-sufficient condition– a positive permission14. Equally, the prohibition to do an 
action whatever it is (in my example the action of hunting deer) implies –as a 
necessary albeit non-sufficient condition– a negative permission, that is to say, the 
faculty of not doing that action. When special and general rules are so related then 
they are necessary consistent and the special one is a logical implication of the 
general one. 
Example 5 
General rule: Religious and other beliefs may be freely professed in private 
and public life. 
Special rule: No one shall be obliged to declare his religious or other beliefs in 
public university entrance examinations. 
The first rule is more general than the second one and the latter might be 
considered even a specification of the former, giving relevance not only to the 
material sphere of each rule but also to their deontic modalities. Of course, according 
to the first rule it is relevant the private and public life in general, rather than the 
context of public university entrance examinations, specifically points out by the 
second rule. This reason of speciality is plain. But, over and above that, the 
reciprocal speciality and generality between these rules could be justified on the 
strength of another distinct assumption: that to be free is equivalent to be unruled. 
This is a disputable assumption if truth be told. However, the second rule is a 
specification of the first general one (i.e. refers to a more specific and equally 
facultative course of action) assuming that to be free means that there is neither a 
duty nor a positive permission. 
Categorization and systematization 
Finally, speciality as generality in law depends mostly on implicit 
categorizations and the conceptual connections constructing among legal concepts 
in legal practice. Logic leaves open to draw possible alternative and even conflicting 
genus-species relationships among concepts. This means that any legal concept 
may become the fulcrum of a genus-species relationship. Which concepts are 
relevant is a variable of previous not logical assumptions. 
Moreover, whenever the basic assumptions are shared in the legal 
community the speciality/generality of the rules will be solidly embedded in legal 
reasoning and there will not be disagreements about it. To the contrary, if the basic 
assumptions of the interpreters are controversial, the special/general nature of rules 
will be a contested matter and it is openly argued in legal reasoning. In this view, the 
consensus and the divergences present in the legal practice about speciality may 
reveal the existence of stable, rather than instable systematics inherent to the legal 
rules of a certain legal system. 
 
                                                 
14 See e.g. Ray (1926), Blanché (2008), Poggi (2000; 2004). 
Silvia Zorzetto 
 
 Nº. 3, septiembre 2012 – febrero 2013, pp. 61-87, ISSN 2253-6655 
 
72 
E
S
T
U
D
I
O
S 
5. The lex specialis principle and the deontic relationships among special and 
general rules 
“Prima facie” conflicts and “total-partial” antinomies 
A leitmotif in the legal thinking about speciality is that the lex specialis 
principle is a positive rule available to solve and prevent the so-called total-partial 
antinomies. The expression, I borrow of course from Alf Ross (2004: 129-130), is 
currently used to indicate such prima facie conflicts between special and general 
rules that are not genuine in the eyes of the interpreters and are able to be removed 
simply using the lex specialis principle. 
Of course, a total-partial antinomy occurs when the deontic modality of a 
more general rule A is opposite to, or in contradiction with the deontic modality of a 
less general rule B (the special rule). A simple example of total-partial antinomy is 
the following one: a general rule that states that a party may avoid a contract for 
mistake of fact conflicts with the special rule that states that a party may not avoid a 
contract for mistake of fact if the risk of the mistake was assumed or should be borne 
by that party according with the circumstances. 
Nevertheless, speaking of total-partial antinomies or of prima facie conflicts is 
a metaphor. On one side, no logical relationship can exist to some extent though not 
entirely. On the other side, no logical opposition or contradiction can appear or 
disappear in virtues of a legal rule. Logical inconsistencies exist or not according to 
the rule of logic and not of law and they regard the intension and not the extension of 
concepts, propositions or prescriptions. 
In this perspective it is misleading to draw a line between such prima facie or 
superficial legal antinomies repealing by derogation and such real legal antinomies 
that create practical dilemmas in the concrete application of rules. The logical 
relationships existing between the special and the general rule are identical in either 
case. The lex specialis principle may be used ex ante or ex post, and the choice 
between the two alternatives is a matter of argumentative strategy and not a matter 
of logic. 
Inconsistencies and redundancies in law 
As I said at the beginning, the analyses about the lex specialis principle are 
focused on legal conflicts among special and general rules and debate in particular 
the possible combinations of the principle with the lex posterior and lex superior 
criteria. This approach is unsatisfactory since total-partial antinomies and derogation 
among special and general rules are two phenomena independent one each other. 
When we consider legal antinomies as a logical issue related to the deontic 
modalities of rules, and not to the application sphere of rules, as I explained above, 
special and general rules may be compatible, opposite or inconsistent or, even, 
irrelated according to their deontic modalities indeed. 
Of course, special and general rules will be compatible if their deontic 
modalities are identical. They are necessarily compatible also when the terms of the 
genus-species relationship are the deontic modalities on their own, as in my 
examples above on vaccination and hunting. 
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Besides, special and general rules may be incompatible: this happens when, 
for instance, one prohibits and the other permits or one obligates and the other does 
not obligate. 
Finally, they may be also irrelative: we have this situation, for instance, when 
one states a special power (viz. to non liquet in case of obscurity of law) with regard 
to a general duty (viz. to render sentences motivated on evidence). 
In actual fact, an important characteristic of legal systems is the co-existence 
of concurrent and repetitive rules not logically inconsistent. There is no doubt that 
one of the main functions of the lex specialis principle is to solve or prevent legal 
antinomies among special and general rules, but nevertheless when a special rule is 
compatible and purely repeats what is stated by a more general one it becomes a 
criterion to solve or prevent a redundancy in law. This latter phenomenon is no less 
crucial than the former. 
When a special rule is compatible with a more general one there is a 
redundancy because the first tells something just told by the second and, conversely, 
the second tells something just told by the first. This happens when the deontic 
modalities of rules are identical but the rules have diverse extent (it is allowed to 
play; it is allowed to play soccer)15. But we have a redundancy even when the 
deontic modalities are compatible, albeit not identical and a rule is more specific than 
another. So, to play soccer is allowed; players should play soccer in compliance with 
the rule of the game; players, except goalkeepers, may not touch the ball with the 
hands or arms during the game, etc. In this view, specifications are fruitful 
redundancies16. 
There are several examples of this use in our legal systems. 
Let us consider for instance the following rules of Italian contract law: an 
agreement is void if it is contrary to a mandatory rule; an agreement that limits or 
releases debtor responsibility in case of gross negligence or fraud is void. These 
rules are compatible and the second one, compared with the first, is a special rule, 
because an agreement that limits or releases debtor responsibility in case of gross 
negligence or fraud is contrary to the mandatory rule of article 1229 Italian Civil 
Code. 
In some branches of law, such as criminal law, special and general rules are 
typically construed as compatible rules. In fact in criminal law, the same action (viz. 
killing her own child by a mother) is often qualified as a crime (viz. infanticide) by a 
special rule and as a different crime (viz. murder) by another more general rule. In all 
these situations special and general rules are concurrent rules and a main problem is 
in fact whether they must be applied together or not; going back to my example, the 
problem is whether the mother must be incriminated only according to the special 
rule that punishes infanticide or also to the general rule that punishes murder. Of 
course, both common law and civil law legal systems have dealt with this problem 
and have principles and doctrines to solve it, such as the double jeopardy doctrine 
and the ne bis in idem principle. It is the conjunction of such principles and doctrines 
with the speciality connection, not the speciality relationship by itself, which makes of 
the infanticide rule an attenuation rather than an aggravation of the punishment for 
                                                 
15 If the rules have the same extent we have two identical rules or one rule, recurring two times. But this 
phenomenon is distinct from speciality, since a special rule by definition cannot have the same extent of 
the general rule regarding a species of a genre. 
16 See e.g. Lazzaro (1985); Nino (1996, pp. 246-248; 1989, pp. 85-101); Ross (2004, pp. 132-133); 
Tarello (1980, pp. 151-152). 
Silvia Zorzetto 
 
 Nº. 3, septiembre 2012 – febrero 2013, pp. 61-87, ISSN 2253-6655 
 
74 
E
S
T
U
D
I
O
S 
murder. In other branches of law the result of a speciality relationship can be quite 
different. 
Redundancies in law and legal certainty 
Thus, approaching the lex specialis principle as a pure criterion against legal 
antinomies is a simplistic habit. The description of the principle made by legal 
scholars and legal philosophers is, all things considered, not a realistic description of 
its uses in the current legal practice. The lex specialis principle comes into play even 
when special and general rules are compatible or thought to be so. Its uses are 
significant in particular when the redundancy seems to be a deficiency of law or 
when the special rule provides a discipline that in the eyes of the interpreters is not 
only less generic but also more suitable than the general rule. 
In legal text there are often syntactic or linguistic indicators that mark 
conceptual links between special and general rules and are a sign of the presence of 
concurrent special and general rules. These traces of redundancies may increase or 
decrease legal certainty, according with the circumstances. 
Let us consider two examples of public law and contract law. 
Example 1. Along park lanes dedicated to bicycles and running often there 
are notices prohibiting the entrance of dogs; sometimes we can find notices that 
prohibit the entrance of dogs on a short leash. 
Example 2. Italian Civil Code says, at art. 1439, that a contract may be voided 
for fraud if without the deception of one party the other would not have concluded the 
contract. On the other hand, a statute on franchising contracts says that if one party 
gives false information, the other party may void the contract according to art. 1439 
Civil Code, and is entitled to damages if any occur (viz. art. 8 of L. n. 129/2004). 
These examples show the extreme complexity of legal classifications. 
It is important to see that the special prohibition against the entrance of dogs 
on a short leash spell out that putting a leash, albeit short, on dogs is not a relevant 
characteristic that allows their entrance in park lanes. The leash and its length do not 
justify a different and opposite regulation. The ratio of the special prohibition is easily 
individuated and it is to keep safe cyclists and runners from the risk of tumbling on 
leashes and dogs. We can say that in this case the co-existence of the special and 
the general rule helps to solve a possible hard case. 
On the contrary, the special rule on voiding franchising contracts seems 
unhelpful and produces uncertainty, since according to its ambiguous content we are 
unable to say how it should be precisely coordinated with the general provision of 
article 1439 Italian Civil Code. In fact, although we know that giving false information 
is a sort of fraud and a contract concluded because of fraud can be voided, we are 
left without guidance as to many others details. For instance, do we have or not to 
perform a counterfactual test as required by the general rule of art. 1439 and, hence, 
verify whether in case of true information the party would not have concluded the 
contract? Moreover, only if damages occur there may be a right to damages; as a 
consequence, in order to make the provision sound have we to conclude that the 
contract may be voided even if the party would have concluded it anyway?17 
                                                 
17 Consider that Italian Civil Code distinguishes between the case in which in absence of fraud the 
contract would not be concluded at all, and the case in which in absence of fraud it would have still be 
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Redundancies in law and logical deduction 
Redundancies in law have paramount importance. To produce special rules 
in presence of more general rule may be not superfluous. General rules are not 
irrelevant in legal reasoning when there are more specific rules. To fail to think of this 
would be naïve. 
Let us consider the following constitutional rules (Articles 15 and 16 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia): Human rights and fundamental freedoms 
provided by this Constitution exceptionally may be temporarily suspended or 
restricted during a war or state of emergency; Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms may be suspended or restricted only for the duration of the war or state of 
emergency, but only to the extent required by such circumstances. 
The second rule is special towards the first and compatible with it, given that 
it specifies the conditions and circumstances in which human rights and fundamental 
freedoms may be temporarily suspended or restricted. The first general rule above is 
itself special and compatible with a third more general constitutional rule such as: 
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be exercised directly on the basis of 
the Constitution and shall be limited only in such cases as are provided by the 
Constitution. The former rules represent in fact a specification of this last rule. 
These examples can help to understand an important aspect of speciality of 
law. As to the content of these rules, the two former special rules, though logically 
compatible and thus logically repetitive or redundant, have however a great 
importance from a legal perspective. While the genus-species relationship is logical-
semantic in nature, however we should not confuse the domains of logic and 
concepts and their rules and relations with the domain of law and its rules. The 
content of special rules is not the result of a pure logical operation. In the domain of 
law we cannot purely derivate special from general rules by logical deduction. The 
existence or inexistence of legal rules is not simply a logical-semantic matter, but 
belongs to material activities and historical-political processes, that is to say, finally, 
human choices and decisions. It follows that a legal system that does not 
contemplate the two special rules I mention above would be very different from a 
legal system that does contemplate them. 
6. The derogation among special and general rules 
The “lex specialis” principle as a meta-rule of legal justification 
My previous examples show that derogation and antinomies are logically 
independent of each other and speciality, in itself, does not requires or entails 
derogation. When we speak of derogation between special and general rules we do 
not deal with their legal concepts or the deontic modalities of rules, but we consider 
rules as reasons of action in the domain of legal justification. 
The phrase “r le    erogates  ro  r le B”  ea s that o l  the   rst r le  , not 
the second rule B must be applied. If rule A derogates from rule B, only the rule A 
enters the chain of legal justification to justify the solution of legal cases; whilst the 
second rule B is excluded from the process of justification. Using the syllogism 
model, we can say that derogation among rules concerns the selection of the major 
                                                                                                                                           
concluded but with a different content. Art. 1439 It. Civ. Cod. provides a right to void the contract for the 
first case, while art. 1440 It. Civ. Cod. provides a right to damages for the second. 
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premise of the syllogism (the so-called external justification, as opposed to the 
internal justification, that is to say the subsumption process). 
In short, derogation is an answer to the question which rule must be applied? 
Or which rule has to be chosen among all those that may qualify the situation in 
hand. This is true relating both to the concrete cases decided by the courts and to 
the abstract cases invented by legal scholars. 
That a first rule derogates from a second rule depends on the existence, in a 
legal system, of a third meta-rule on legal application. In a legal system there can be 
many different meta-rules that state that a certain kind of rules derogate from 
another. According to these meta-rules, a rule can derogate from the others for many 
different reasons. The lex specialis principle is only one of these meta-rules and its 
characteristic feature is that the reason of derogation is the genus-species 
relationship. 
According to the lex specialis principle any special rule derogates from all 
those one more general, precisely on the strength of its higher speciality/lower 
generality, and not –albeit most theories argue the opposite– on the strength of its 
inconsistency. 
There, the usual way of presenting the lex specialis principle is incomplete 
and misleading. 
It is incomplete because it ignores one side of the matter: all the uses in 
which a redundancy rather than an antinomy is open to debate. It is also misleading 
because it confuses two alternative and distinct reasons of derogation (speciality and 
inconsistency). 
As a result, the common view about the lex specialis runs the risk to 
surreptitiously increase judicial discretion in the selection of rules to support 
outcomes reached on other grounds. In this respect, it is important not to forget that, 
which rule ought to prevail, whether the special or the general one, is not decided by 
logic and it is not a plain consequence of speciality. 
To the contrary, the choice of the rule that must be applied depends on the 
meta-rules on the application of law that exist in each legal system. In this, each 
legal system makes its own choices. 
The criterion “lex generalis derogat speciali” and other clauses 
From all this, it can be said that special rules derogate from general ones but 
it can also be said that certain general rules shall derogate from special rules and 
prevail on them according to the opposite criterion lex generalis derogat legi speciali. 
For instance, the article 2672 of the Italian Civil Code provides an unless 
clause for those provisions of special statutes that impose a transcription in real 
property registers of acts different from those enumerated by the Code and of all the 
other provisions not inconsistent with Civil Code rules on transcription: this means 
that the Civil Code general rules derogate from and prevail with respect to the 
inconsistent special provisions of other statutes. 
On the other hand, it can also happen that certain special and general rules 
must be applied together rather than derogate each other. Consider for instance 
co  o  cla ses s ch as these: “Notw thsta    g s bsect o  …”, “These art cles are 
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without prej   ce to…” or “Irrespect ve o  the prov s o s o  paragraphs… o  th s 
art cle”. 
Clauses such as these are embedded meta-rules regulating the application of 
law and they can be included in general as well as in special rules. In both cases 
they impose to interpreters to put together some special and general rules in order to 
achieve a consistent combination among them. 
Sometimes legislation contemplates complex versions of the lex specialis 
principle. Consider a relevant example with broad application in international law, art. 
2 of the Annex 2 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes: 
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or 
additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered 
agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this Understanding. To the extent that 
there is a difference between the rules and procedures of this Understanding and the 
special or additional rules and procedures set forth in Appendix 2, the special or 
additional rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall prevail. In disputes involving 
rules and procedures under more than one covered agreement, if there is a conflict 
between special or additional rules and procedures of such agreements under 
review, and where the parties to the dispute cannot agree on rules and procedures 
within 20 days of the establishment of the panel, the Chairman of the Dispute 
Settlement Body provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2 (referred to in this 
U  ersta    g  as the “DSB”),    co s ltat o  w th the part es to the   sp te, shall 
determine the rules and procedures to be followed within 10 days after a request by 
either Member. The Chairman shall be guided by the principle that special or 
additional rules and procedures should be used where possible, and the rules and 
procedures set out in this Understanding should be used to the extent necessary to 
avoid conflict. 
This provision clearly shows that the lex specialis principle is part of positive 
law, where it may function equally as a criterion to solve or prevent antinomies and 
as a criterion to connect and unify special and general rules in order to achieve a 
more complete regulation of a certain matter. 
The “lex specialis” principle in criminal law 
As I remember above, in many legal systems the lex specialis principle is 
used to solve the concurrence of crimes. For my purposes, it is significant that its 
formulation changes in each legal system. 
For instance, the Italian penal code states at art. 15 that unless the contrary is 
stated, special statutes or provisions derogate general ones, when the same matter 
is regulated by more than a criminal statute or provision of the same criminal statute. 
Italian criminal lawyers interpret this article as an instance of the lex specialis 
principle18. 
First, it is important to note that it contains an unless-clause (unless the 
contrary is stated) that leaves open the possibility that other provisions might provide 
different criteria. Both the Italian Penal Code and many other Italian criminal statutes 
contain numerous rules and clauses that exclude derogation or state different reason 
of derogation such as the typology of punishments or the competent legal authority 
(viz. federal, national, local, European authorities, etc.). 
                                                 
18 See e.g. Conti (1959); Pagliaro (1961); De Francesco (1980); Romano (2004); Masera (2006); Gatta 
(2008: 169). 
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Second, we can compare art. 15 of the Italian Penal Code with art. 8 of the 
Spanish Penal Code: Los hechos susceptibles de ser calificados con arreglo a dos o 
más preceptos de este Código, y no comprendidos en los artículos 73 a 77, se 
castigarán observando las siguientes reglas: 1ª. El precepto especial se aplicará con 
preferencia al general. 2ª. El precepto subsidiario se aplicará sólo en defecto del 
principal, ya se declare expresamente dicha subsidiariedad, ya sea ésta tácitamente 
deducible. 3ª. El precepto penal más amplio o complejo absorberá a los que 
castiguen las infracciones consumidas en aquél. 4ª. En defecto de los criterios 
anteriores, el precepto penal más grave excluirá los que castiguen el hecho con 
pena menor19. 
The task of both the Italian and Spanish statements above is to regulate the 
redundancies among criminal rules; however they say something different. Saying 
that los hechos son susceptibles de ser calificados con arreglo a dos o más 
preceptos as does the Spanish Penal Code is in fact another way to approach the 
matter of redundancy in law. Under this respect, the legal drafting of the Spanish 
Penal Code is better than the Italian one: while the Italian version uses the 
a b g o s express o  “sa e  atter” to  el   t the relevant rules among which 
judges have to select the right one, the Spanish one refers explicitly to its purpose, 
that is regulating the phenomenon of multiple qualification of actions by criminal 
rules. 
Now, both Italian and Spanish statements express meta-rules on application 
of law. But art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code enumerates explicitly four criteria: i) the 
lex specialis principle; ii) the principal/subsidiary criterion (usually, this criterion is 
e be  e     legal state e ts cla ses s ch as “Except where otherw se state ”, 
“  less the sa e act o   s p   she  b  art cle. …” or “ rrespect ve w th the other 
prov s o s o  th s art cle or paragraph …” a   so o ); iii) the incorporation criterion, 
which typically involves a reasoning such as this: killing a man has a greater 
offensiveness than damaging his clothes, hence murder prevails on damages; iv) the 
criterion of the measure of punishments, that major crimes prevail on minor ones. 
Art. 15 Italian Penal Code states the lex specialis principle as a general rule 
adding an unless open clause. 
However, we do not have to exaggerate this difference in legal texts. The four 
criteria enumerated above are in fact widely used in Italian criminal law, as in many 
other countries, albeit not expressly formulated in penal codes or statutes as in 
Spain. 
Therefore, it is important to see that all these four criteria may be applied to 
special and general rules; but while the lex specialis principle may be applied only if 
there is a genus-species relationship; the other three criteria may be applied 
whenever criminal rules interfere. 
In fact principal/subsidiary rules, incorporated/incorporating rules and 
minor/major severe rules may be correlated from genus to species and, hence, refer 
to a genre and a species, but they may also overlap solely in a certain extent and, 
hence, rule each one a different species. Typical examples of the latter rules are 
rules such as hunting deer is prohibited and hunting in natural parks is prohibited; or 
every citizen has the right to vote and women have the right to vote. Legal scholars 
 a e th s s t at o  “b lateral or rec procal spec al t ”. Th s  s a   slea   g  ot o , as 
                                                 
19 See e.g. Bacigalupo (1999: 570); Ruiz Sanz (2003); Palma Herrera (2008); Prieto Sanchís (2002) 
and the historical analysis of Matus (2001a: 295-371; 2001b: 357-400). 
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inclusion and interference are two distinct logical relationships: the first is 
represented by two circles one wholly included in the other; while the second is 
represented by two circles each of one overlaps the other only to a certain extent. 
All of this is well known and obvious. But it is important to see that if the 
principal rule is also special with regards to a subsidiary more general one, then the 
principal/subsidiary criterion produces the same result as the lex specialis principle. 
On the contrary, if the principal rule is more general than the subsidiary one, then the 
principal/subsidiary criterion operates in the opposite direction than the principle lex 
generalis derogat speciali. 
Furthermore, the incorporation criterion can be construed as a sort of lex 
specialis principle and, conversely, our principle is sometimes conceived as the 
incorporation criterion. Man  legal scholars a   j  ges a opt a “s ste  o  cr  es” 
based on the values and goods protected by criminal rules and thus classify criminal 
rules according to their degree of offensiveness. In this perspective, as seen above, 
murder normally includes or absorbs damages and bodily harm; equally, to make 
another typical example, rape or sexual assault normally includes or absorbs 
violence. 
Consider that in a well-ordered criminal system punishments should be 
proportionate to criminal offensiveness to values protected by criminal rules. In such 
case the lex specialis principle in the sense of incorporation criterion turns to 
coincide with the criterion of major/minor punishment. 
7. Some argumentative uses of the lex specialis principle 
An agenda for further research 
Most legal practicians currently use the lex specialis principle in ways rather 
different from a criterion against antinomies or redundancies in law I illustrated 
above. In this last paragraph I will present other two main uses of the principle. 
A first use is known as the ejusdem generis rule and is typical in particular of 
common law legal culture. Yet, as the name reveals, this rule is original of Roman 
law tradition and these days it is widespread also in civil law legal systems, albeit 
ignored by current continental theories about the lex specialis principle. In this use 
the lex specialis principle is a lexical argument and it applies directly and openly to 
legal concepts. 
The second use of the lex specialis principle is less evident but has great 
importance in legal reasoning. The principle is frequently embedded in complex 
argumentative schemes in which the idea that special rules derogate from those 
more general is combined with other traditional legal arguments. 
The following points are mere sketches and hints that require further studies. 
The doctrine of “ejusdem generis”  
When the lex specialis principle is used as the ejusdem generis rule, the idea 
that lex specialis derogate generali turns into the idea that generi per speciem 
derogatur (i.e. species derogate from genus). This was the medieval and most 
philosophical interpretation of the Latin legal maxim (Stein, 1968; Talamanca, 1977). 
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The idea is that generi per speciem derogatur applies generally to criminal 
statutes and other general acts or to private acts such as contracts. This is a 
conceptual scheme used mainly when there are definition and series of words in a 
legal text. 
In a common perspective it is a rule of construction of legal texts: where 
general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the 
general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same 
general nature or class as those enumerated (In re New Castle County De, Appellant 
v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, 2000; Garner, 1999). 
According to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, this rule is an instrumentality for 
ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty. Ordinarily, it 
limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified; 
but it may not be used to defeat the obvious purpose of legislation. And, while (…) 
statutes are narrowly construed, this does not require rejection of that sense of the 
words which best harmonizes with the context and the end in view (In re United 
States v. Powell, 1975; In re Gooch v. United States, 1936). Courts sometimes 
consider it as one phase of the application of the broader rule under the maxim 
noscitur a sociis which is defined The meaning of a doubtful word may be 
ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it (Broom's Legal 
Maxims) and, hence, apply it where the general words precede the specific terms, 
when it is manifest that such particular terms have reference to subjects embraced 
within the meaning of the general words (In re Spartan Airlines Inc., 1947). 
This version of the lex specialis principle represents a lexical legal argument 
in the genuine sense that regards legal lexicon. Considering it a literal or a textual 
canon, according to the common view, is slippery. In reality, it is an argumentative 
scheme to determine the specific content of those legal concepts that are expressed 
in general in legal statements and especially in legal definitions. There it is important 
to repeat once more time that even in this version the lex specialis principle does not 
regard words and signs, single terms or syntagmas. The idea that generi per 
speciem derogatur is indeed a rule to shape the conceptual relationships among 
legal concepts. In short, concepts and not linguistic terms are, properly speaking, the 
species and the genus. 
Hybrid argumentative schemes 
In addition, many arguments used in legal practice are a combination of the 
lex specialis principle with others traditional legal arguments. In actual fact the lex 
specialis principle is used together and appears jointly with typical legal arguments 
such as, to give some samples, the a contrariis argument, the rule from principles, 
the ratio legis rule, the mischief rule, the golden rule, the reasonable rule, the 
intention of legislator rule and so on (In re Rodgers v. United States case, (1902), 
Supreme Court of United States, No. 137, 185 U.S. 83). 
Thus, the common argument according to which it is unreasonable to have 
two rules that say the same thing so as the more specific one says truly something 
different is but another formulation of the lex specialis principle when special and 
general rules are compatible one each other. This argument has various names 
(maybe, the most common names are the economic argument and the reasonable 
legislator canon). According with a certain view it expresses an essential feature of a 
rational legislator (Nino, 1989). What is more important is that, on one hand, it 
applies to rules able to exist or occur together without any conflict; on the other hand, 
it requires a further justification, since we can ever ask why to repeat a certain rule 
would be unreasonable. Still in legal texts, as in common discourses, sometimes 
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repetitions are far from unreasonable and to the contrary they seem perfectly 
justified. Moreover, in many significant circumstances anaphora is a deliberated 
strategy to structure legal texts (this is patent for instance especially in European 
legislation, as the numerous repetition within the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty of on the Functioning of the European Union reveal: inter alia, viz. articles 24 
and 31 TUE, and 20 and 21 TFUE20). 
Sometimes the lex specialis principle merges into a peculiar version of the a 
contrariis argument. According to two common arguments, every general legal rule 
should be applied only to the genus and not to its species, unless a special rule 
states the contrary and everything that is not explicitly permitted by a special rule 
should be considered as implicitly forbidden21. These arguments are internally 
contradictory strictly applied. According to the first argument, general rules should 
not be applied in any case, unless an express rule provides the converse. But, this 
patently denies the generality as it is: in virtues of generality, general rules apply 
necessarily to a genre including all the species. The second argument entails that 
any species would be regulated as opposed as the genre and hence every other 
species too. This argument represents a general stop to generality in law. But it is 
unfeasible giving that opposition is a two-terms relationship, while the species of a 
genus may be uncountable and in logic are infinite in number. 
However, the two arguments above mentioned are closed to another 
common argument: it is widespread the belief that when a special rule seems 
incomplete, in order to fulfil the discipline of the species general rules might be 
applied but not directly, instead by analogical reasoning22. 
This thesis is fallacious. In fact, the analogical reasoning is able to run 
according to two genres or to a genre and a species of another genre, but not with 
reference to a genre and its species. As it is well known, the analogical reasoning 
consists in the determination of a remarkable similarity between two entities that 
                                                 
20  rt  cle 24 TUE “1. (…) The co  o   ore g  a   sec r t   pol c   s s bjec t to spec   c r les  a   
procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting 
unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be 
excl  e . ”  rt  cle 31 TUE “1. Dec s o s     er th s Chapter [i.e. Specific provisions on the common 
foreign and security policy] shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, 
except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.” 
 rt  cle 20 TFEU “2. C t ze s  o  the U  o  shall e j o  the r ghts a   be s bje ct to the   t  es prov  e   or 
in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia: (a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States; (b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European 
Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State; (c) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State 
of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities 
of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State; (d) the right to petition the 
European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and 
advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language. 
These rights shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and 
b  the  eas re s a opt e  there   er .”;  r t cle 21 TFUE “1. Ever  c t ze  o  the U  o  shall have the 
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and 
co   t  o s  la    o w     the Treat es a   b  the  eas res  a op te  to g ve the  e  ect”. 
21 See e.g. Tribunal of Rome, Sez. V, decree 6-22 July 2011; Tribunal of Varese, ordinance 20 
December 2011; Tribunal of Rome, Sez. V, decree 8 February 2012; Tribunal of Catania, Sez. I, decree 
24 February 2012; Tribunal of Como, Sez. Cantù, ordinance, 2 February 2012; Tribunal of Palermo, 
Sez. Bagheria, ordinance 30 December 2011. All these decisions concern civil mediation and in 
particular the issue whether private agreements on usucaption concluded ahead of a mediator may or 
not be presented for transcription in the real property official registers. The first two decisions are 
available on-line at http://www.101mediatori.it/pagina/sentenze (Date of access: August 31, 2012); all 
the others are on-line available at http://www.progettoconciliamo.it/giurisprudenza/1,320,1 (Date of 
access: August 31, 2012).  
22 See e.g. Mandrioli and Carratta (2012: 315, 326, 320). 
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under all other respects are assumed as distinct and unrelated. Even though this last 
assumption often remains unexpressed, it is an essential feature of analogical 
reasoning, because it is the bases on which the reasoning starts. Only upon this 
assumption the identification among many differences of a relevant similarity makes 
sense and this identification is the core of analogical reasoning. So, if this is true, the 
fundamental bases of analogical reasoning lacks when we have a genre and its 
species. Obviously, between a genre and its species there is no a broad bundle of 
differences but an identified common element and a specific difference. 
A last striking argument related to speciality of law concerns the authentic 
interpretation, i.e. the interpretat o   a e b  the “sa e” a thor t  that pro  ces what 
has to be interpreted. In an opinion, this kind of interpretation would be done only 
with regard to special provisions and not to those general23. Expressed so broadly 
the argument is spurious because of neither the generality nor the speciality itself 
preclude or contribute interpreting authentically a certain legal provision. However, 
the thesis in hand catches a glimpse of truth. It can be amended saying that when 
we have a generic statement, each of the possible interpretations that concerns only 
a particular species rather than the whole genre to which the statement refers, does 
not represent, in the actual fact, a genuine interpretation of the original statement 
and to the contrary it makes explicit another more specific rule (a special rule). This 
is another evidence of the circumstance that speciality can be bound up to 
specification and derogation, and it is logically distinct from inconsistencies in law. 
To conclude, a close analysis of the lex specialis principle gives two main 
lessons. First, its role as a criterion against legal antinomies is not the sole one 
existing in legal practice and, maybe, it is not the most common and remarkable one. 
Second, the lex specialis principle represents a pervasive, albeit implicit scheme of 
reasoning when taking into account its overlappings and combinations with the other 
traditional legal arguments constructing legal reasoning. 
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